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Responding to the Crisis: Economic Stabilisation Grants 
 
Guy Standing
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Abstract 
This article reviews some of the mainstream policies proposed to tackle the economic crisis of 
2008-09 and its aftermath, and goes on to advocate a policy of Economic Stabilisation Grants 
(ESGs). It argues that ESGs, which would be paid to every citizen at a rate that could be varied 
according to the severity of the crisis, would be more effective in boosting aggregate demand and 
more efficient in terms of resource allocation. Unlike the alternatives, ESGs would also address 
directly two key issues deriving from the process of globalisation, namely, the growth of 
systemic uncertainty and rising inequality (98 words). 
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1. The transformation crisis 
 
The shock of 2008 was a double crisis. It was a Keynesian crisis, albeit the first on a global 
scale. When the financial bubble burst, and panic set in, all could see that households, 
corporations and governments had been over-consuming and under-saving. The resultant crisis 
fed into shrinking aggregate demand. Faced with the prospect of a first global depression, 
governments rushed into a huge fiscal and monetary stimulus. This averted a slump, but did so at 
the longer-term cost of generating huge budget deficits. It looked as if the crisis had been 
checked merely to create another in its wake. 
 
The second crisis was less appreciated. It may be called a transformation crisis, which 
could not be resolved by the sort of Keynesian policies that governments had embraced with 
alacrity. Indeed, by generating those budget deficits they risked making matters even worse. The 
transformation crisis reflected the growth of economic insecurity and various forms of inequality 
in the globalisation era. They have generated a global ‘precariat’, insecure and frustrated, a new 
dangerous class (Standing, 2009). 
 
There were many reasons for widening inequality. The main one was the entry of China 
and India into the open global economy, which quadrupled global labour supply by making a 
billion newcomers available to labour at a tiny fraction of the cost in rich countries. The 
bargaining power of capital increased and the functional distribution of income moved steadily 
in favour of capital. Not only did income distribution become more unequal, but conventional 
measures of income underestimated its growth; non-wage enterprise benefits and state benefits 
were eroded for lower-income groups, while richer members of the ‘salariat’ retained or gained 
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entitlement to them. Real wages in countries such as the USA and France either stagnated or 
declined, contributing to incipient social unrest. 
 
Though precipitated by a financial market failure, the crisis was one of systemic 
uncertainty converted into a problem of deficient aggregate demand through a rising ex ante 
propensity to save and a falling ex ante propensity to invest. This was made worse by a trend 
towards Fisherian deflation, a downward spiral of falling assets and goods prices linked to the 
rundown of debt and economic contraction. For a sustainable recovery, the solution must lie not 
only in boosting demand but also in reducing uncertainty by promoting economic security and 
stability. 
 
Globalisation and the neo-liberal agenda – the building of a global market society – 
rejected economic security. Friedrich Hayek, the Nobel Laureate economist seen as the father of 
globalisation and its economic policies, scornfully dismissed economic security as a false goal in 
his Road to Serfdom (1944). This was the error of the globalisation era. Society rejects the 
human need for security at its peril. 
 
The institutional reforms pursued since the 1980s, under the aegis of the Washington 
Consensus, dismantled the protective regulations and mechanisms of social democracy, 
including the social security system that had hinged on labourist contributions. For all its 
limitations, that system had automatic stabilisers; as demand fell and unemployment rose, money 
was pumped out via state benefits, thereby tending to restore aggregate demand. By the 1980s, 
old-style social democracy was no longer progressive or sustainable. But the main consequence 
of the neo-liberal strategy was not just more economic insecurity, sold as the necessary price for 
increased growth and flexibility. The character of economic insecurity changed. 
 
To understand the globalisation crisis and what policies are feasible and desirable, it is 
essential to understand the nature of current economic insecurity. Briefly, in the post-1945 
‘Keynesian welfare state’ era, the main forms of insecurity in industrialised countries were 
labour-based contingency risks, involving what Beveridge famously called ‘temporary 
interruptions of earnings power’. For the majority in the labour market, the probability of 
unemployment was low and a solidaristic unemployment insurance benefit scheme worked 
reasonably well. This is no longer the case. 
   
The global market society creates three distinctive features – volatility, a long-term trend 
towards greater functional income inequality, and systemic uncertainty associated with a higher 
propensity for economies to suffer from periodic shocks. The global economy has become more 
prone to economic crises, involving sudden downturns that spread from one country or region to 
others (ILO Socio-Economic Security Programme, 2004, p.27).
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  Moreover, as Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009) have shown, downturns after banking crises are typically long and deep, touching bottom 
only after two years while unemployment reaches its peak almost five years after a crash. For these 
reasons, devising a system to provide ex post compensation for adverse outcomes of risk and 
uncertainty has become impossible. Any system to insure against shocks would require high 
premiums and entail extensive moral and immoral hazards.
3
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There was ample warning of the financial crisis. And there is no evidence or reason for 
thinking the incidence of shocks will decline or that the growing functional income inequality 
will be reversed without corrective action. That is the economic context. Sooner or later 
governments will overcome the toxic debt situation.
4
 But we need to know how to overcome the 
systemic uncertainty and reverse the growing income inequality that characterise the 
transformation crisis. 
 
A Global Transformation has been taking place, in which impediments to a global market 
society have been eroded, strategically and deliberately. As Polanyi (2001) said of similar 
developments in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, ‘Laissez-faire was planned.’ Using 
his terms, the globalisation era has been one of ‘disembeddedness’, when the economy is largely 
outside the control of society. In the Polanyian framework, any attempt to create ‘self-regulating 
markets’ cannot continue without mounting social, economic and political dangers. Insecurities 
and inequalities multiply until a crisis occurs that demands a new system of protection, 
regulation and redistribution. However, whereas Polanyi was analysing the creation of national 
market economies – and was too teleological for comfort – today’s transformation is about the 
painful forging of a global market economy. We have yet to adapt to that paradigm shift. 
 
A crisis will not necessarily lead to a period of ‘re-embeddedness’, with moderated 
insecurities and inequalities. The present crisis nevertheless provides the opportunity and the 
challenge to sculpt new policies and institutions that will re-embed the economy in society.  
 
In thinking of new policies, five interpretative points, or premises, should be borne in 
mind. First, the globalisation era was not one of deregulation. In the labour market, the sphere of 
economic policy with which I am most familiar, probably more new regulations were introduced 
than in any comparable period of history. It was the nature of the regulations that changed. There 
has never been a period of deregulation. 
   
Second, the role of the state and of government has not ‘shrunk’, as is commonly asserted. 
But it too has changed. Fiscal and social security policies, for instance, have been transformed 
under the impact of globalisation, from being mildly progressive and solidaristic – providing 
low-wage earners with social security – to being regressive and increasingly directional. 
 
The reduction in progressivity has been rationalised by claims that more incentives were 
needed for investors and merit-worthy individuals, who might go abroad unless they were 
humoured. The reduction in the social solidarity character of welfare systems of most countries 
was rationalised by a desire to cut public social spending and a belief that, in a well-functioning 
market economy, unemployment was essentially voluntary and was due to excessive protective 
regulations, ‘rigidities’ and high reservation wages. Consequently, unemployment was seen 
increasingly as due to personal failings. The shift to means testing was followed by 
acknowledgement of poverty and unemployment ‘traps’, which was followed by tighter 
behavioural controls on those on the margins of the labour market. 
       
Third, it would be folly if a new generation of policymakers tried to recreate the policies 
and institutions of a past ‘golden age’. There were good reasons for dismantling the social 
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democratic architecture, even though for a period it had been a progressive and functional set of 
arrangements. The welfare state, in its various guises, was suited to an industrial society and a 
closed economy model. We now have a twenty-first century tertiary society and increasingly 
open economies. Trying to opt for some sort of ‘de-globalisation’ would be populist and 
doomed. 
 
Fourth, the national and international banking and financial markets should be regulated 
more effectively. This must involve international coordination, if only because liberalisation has 
made financial market integration a reality. A few decades ago, if one stock market declined, 
investors could switch to another where ‘prices’ were rising. By about 1980, movements on the 
US stock exchange were followed in the same direction by other stock exchanges about 40% of 
the time. Now, that happens in about 90% of cases. This is merely an indicator of the extent of 
global economic integration. It stretches credulity to imagine that it will be reversed. 
 
Fifth, the crisis has punctured a key presumption of the globalisation model, that inequality 
does not matter. Not only have earned incomes become more unequal but so have sources of 
security; the wealthy have access to more sources of income protection than those on low incomes. As 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) have shown, it is inequality rather than wealth or income level as such that 
produces a high incidence of most social ills. Rising inequality leads to more anxiety, status frustration, 
stress and social illness for all groups, not just the poorest and most insecure. The widening of 
income inequality in the UK since the 1980s was the greatest in the developed world, implying 
that it was due in part to political decisions, with the result that Britain now has the third highest 
level of income inequality after the USA and Portugal.  
  
Part of the genius of Franklin Roosevelt is said to have been his early recognition that the 
biggest problem in the Depression was the basic structural flaw in the economy that had 
produced a severe maldistribution of wealth, coupled with excessively low incomes and wages 
(Badger, 2009). The current US President, Barack Obama, also appears to have recognised that 
the biggest flaw in the globalisation model of market capitalism was its willing acceptance of 
rising income inequality. Income distribution is back on the political agenda. 
 
The following reviews some of the mainstream policies proposed to tackle the crisis and 
goes on to advocate a policy of Economic Stabilisation Grants (ESGs) that takes account of these 
contextual points. In all cases, it would be appropriate to apply policy ‘stress tests’ that, in this 
author’s view, should not only include economic effectiveness (boosting aggregate demand) and 
efficiency (improving use of resources), but also whether the policy addresses the two key issues 
of systemic uncertainty and rising inequality. 
    
      
2. Conventional policy alternatives 
 
The global crisis has taken its toll of many millions of people’s lives. Citizens are 
encouraged to scowl at a token handful of individuals, ‘bankers’. Governments desperately acted 
to keep failed institutions alive and suspended their past reasoning in the quest to rescue them. If 
they were real neo-liberals, they should have ruled out rescue plans. Let the market do its job! 
The plans that emerged implied a new depth to the notion of moral hazard. 
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Let us leave that to the conscience of those who claim to believe in the old model and 
instead consider what seem to be the mainstream responses. 
      
A. Quantitative easing 
 
The UK Government and the Bank of England placed great faith in ‘quantitative easing’, 
an ungainly term for increasing the money supply. It was necessary. But it was not a policy; it 
was a reaction. It was introduced by policymakers whose position had imploded. That surely 
cannot instil confidence that the reaction was properly thought through. 
 
There is historical evidence to support the idea. Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, in 
their book The Great Contraction (2008), concluded that the Federal Reserve’s quantitative 
easing after 1932, through purchasing Treasury bonds to keep yields low, was vital in dragging 
the US economy out of the Depression. Amusingly, Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve 
Chairman, when advocating quantitative easing, referred to the metaphor of dropping money 
from helicopters, drawing from a famous essay by Friedman (1969, pp.4-5) and promptly 
earning himself the nickname of ‘Helicopter Ben’. 
 
The use of conventional monetary policy to respond to the financial crisis was constrained 
by the fact that interest rates were already close to zero, making it impractical to lower them to 
boost demand. This is the essence of the Keynesian liquidity trap. The intention of quantitative 
easing was expand the money supply directly to increase the availability of credit and boost 
investment, partly by raising confidence. But a downside of quantitative easing is that it 
penalises savers, giving a twist to the liquidity trap. Cutting interest rates, and feeding money to 
borrowers, meant that those who had saved for retirement or to supplement low earnings, had a 
lower income flow and had to run down their capital (savings). Since savers outnumber 
borrowers by about six to one, the policy was prima facie inegalitarian. 
 
Savers had done nothing wrong, except to follow the urgings of successive governments 
and mainstream economists over two decades. The IMF, World Bank and OECD had all 
eulogised ‘private savings accounts’ and defined-contribution private pensions. Now those who 
took their advice were penalised. Quantitative easing may help them in the medium term – for 
those who live that long – if it lifts economic activity. But a combination of zero real interest 
rates, and an inflationary injection of money going to others, could not make ordinary savers feel 
more secure. 
 
In addition, quantitative easing was a reaction to a systemic lack of confidence, which may 
in fact be exacerbated by lurches in policy. As Keynes noted (1936, p.172): ‘A large increase in 
the quantity of money may cause so much uncertainty about the future that liquidity preferences 
due to the precautionary motive may be strengthened.’ The European Economic Advisory Group 
declared in its 2009 report on the European economy that ‘there is even the possibility that large 
interventions paradoxically exacerbate the fall in consumer and business confidence, by 
conveying the message that the crisis is far worse than expected.’ The Economist (2009a) also 
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concluded: ‘people (and banks) may cling to cash more tightly if they are spooked.’ There is 
something ‘spooky’ about quantitative easing. 
 
In a fascinating paper (Haldane, 2009), the Bank of England’s newly appointed executive 
director for financial stability said banks had not understood the risks they were taking through a 
mixture of ‘disaster myopia’ (a tendency to underestimate risk), lack of awareness of ‘network 
externalities’ (spillovers from one institution to another) and ‘misaligned incentives’. One feels 
like asking if this was the time to put faith in the financial sector to revive the economy. 
 
In short, monetary policy may have achieved a temporary revival, but it did so in a costly, 
inefficient and limited way. It failed to deal with systemic uncertainty and may have exacerbated 
rather than attenuated inequalities. 
 
B. Subsidies and industrial policy 
 
Proponents of selective subsidies argued that, given a general collapse of demand, firms 
that were ‘otherwise viable’ should be helped until conditions improved. Governments made 
liquidity and other forms of support for banks conditional on increased focus on domestic 
lending (Warner, 2009), extended loan guarantees and paid out billions of dollars to keep other 
hard-hit sectors, notably the car industry, afloat. 
 
The various ‘cash for clunkers’ schemes, in Germany, France and the USA, for example, 
succeeded in inducing people to buy new cars but, once the costly schemes ended, demand 
predictably plummeted. Meanwhile, bail-outs of so-called ‘strategic’ industries (which in France 
included Meccano, a venerable toy manufacturer) have spawned a revival of industrial policy 
across the industrialised world, with the USA, Japan and European countries all vying to boost 
manufacturing competitiveness and jobs, often in the same industries. Industrial policy amounts 
to identifying and giving selective subsidies to potential winners; it has been tried in many places 
at many times and has mostly failed after vast sums have been spent (see Economist, 2010). This 
time will be no different. While manufacturing was particularly hard hit by the crisis (Economist, 
2009b), global de-industrialisation and restructuring have been taking place over several 
decades. Globally, there will be fewer manufacturing jobs after the recession.  
 
Instead, the world is in danger of slipping into an era of subsidy protectionism, as 
governments turn to subsidies in increasingly clever guises. Apart from subsidies aimed directly 
at particular industries, mostly crafted to skirt World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, tax 
credits paid to top up wages, such as the US Earned Income Tax Credit, also subsidise labour-
intensive low-paying sectors, reducing the cost of domestic production and making it harder for 
imports to compete. They are thereby trade distorting, even though they have escaped WTO 
scrutiny for the moment. 
   
In the present crisis, governments have turned to labour subsidies of various kinds in their 
attempts to bring down the unemployment count. Yet such subsidies have five common failings. 
They are cumbersome and costly to administer. They encourage and reward inefficiency. They 
induce huge substitution effects (employers recruit people who are subsidised in place of 
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unsubsidised workers). They have huge deadweight effects (the jobs would have been created 
anyway, regardless of the subsidy). And they are usually inequitable and regressive, often in 
concealed ways. 
 
One popular subsidy is wage assistance for short-time working as an alternative to 
redundancy. As one commentator (Warner, 2009) put it, 
 
For countries with relatively high levels of social security benefit, it makes some sense. Paying 
workers to do nothing but to be ready to reapply themselves when the economy picks up may seem 
preferable to paying them dole and having their skills lost for ever to the ranks of the long-term 
unemployed.  
 
In the Netherlands, the government agreed to pay most of the wages for a short period if 
workers were put on a three-day or four-day week. In the UK, this was urged by union leaders 
such as Tony Woodley, joint general secretary of Unite (Woodley, 2009). 
 
An economist should be more sceptical. Keeping workers on the books in the unwinding 
Soviet Union had disastrous consequences, as it did in China in the late 1990s. Such workers are 
less likely to acquire new skills that might be needed in a recovery, and may become more prone 
to social illnesses than those obliged to come to terms with new economic realities while they 
still have energy and savings. Moreover, firms under pressure would be encouraged to take the 
easy option, putting workers on short time and taking a subsidy, when they might otherwise take 
different actions that would prepare them for restructuring to take advantage of an upturn. And, 
if a government supports one sector, it will soon be under pressure to support others as well. 
    
Even more popular have been marginal employment subsidies, intended to encourage job 
creation. In June 2010, the first budget of the new UK coalition government granted start-up 
businesses outside the south-east a 12-month exemption from national insurance (social security) 
contributions on the first ten people they hire, up to a maximum of £5,000 per employee or 
£50,000 per firm. The government estimates that some 400,000 firms could qualify. In the USA, 
the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, signed into law in March 2010, gives tax 
credits to businesses that hire workers who have been unemployed for eight weeks or more. By 
September 2010, the US administration was claiming that firms qualifying for the credit had 
hired 5.6 million workers. 
 
Many economists have argued in favour of marginal employment subsidies, the leading 
advocate being the Nobel Prize winner, Edmund Phelps (1997). Yet they are inefficient and 
contribute to protectionism via the backdoor (for a critique, see Standing, 2002, chapter 9). 
Evaluations of previous schemes show very high deadweight and substitution effects – over 95% 
for Ireland’s Employment Incentive Scheme in the 1980s, for instance (Betcherman and Islam, 
2001, p.319). Schemes of this sort also produce moral and immoral hazards. One is what I have 
called auntie effects. Suddenly, auntie is employed, at a very low wage no doubt, and an 
application is in the post to obtain the subsidy. In the Netherlands, a wage subsidy was 
introduced for firms if they had suffered a 30% sales decline over two months. This could induce 
firms to make sure their sales decline passed the 30% threshold. 
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Another drawback is the unfairness of subsidies given for new jobs, or to new firms. Why 
should a firm that expands now be given a subsidy when another has been providing jobs for 
many years? After all, if the subsidy works as claimed, it will lower production costs for the 
newer firm, thus weakening the position of the older firm. It may even jeopardise the survival 
prospects of the older firm, which might be the more productive. This would be neither fair nor 
economically sensible. 
  
Subsidies benefit middle-income and higher-income groups disproportionately and 
‘leakages’ are notoriously high. In other words, the boost to aggregate demand is less than 
implied by the sum spent on them. This is partly because the more affluent have a relatively low 
average and marginal propensity to consume, and partly because this group has an above-average 
propensity to spend on imported goods and services. So, to give a net boost to the national 
economy, the gross sum must be much larger. 
    
In sum, subsidies (and industrial policy) fail all the policy stress tests. They are ineffective 
in raising aggregate demand and employment; they are inefficient, distorting resource allocation; 
they do nothing to alleviate uncertainty; and they are inegalitarian, benefiting the better off rather 
than the poor.   
         
C. Active labour market policy 
 
Particularly in a recession, much hope is placed in so-called active labour market policy to 
put people into jobs. It is expected to boost employment, raise productivity, increase social 
mobility, strengthen social inclusion and reduce income inequality. And recently, its advocates 
have given the assurance that it will make people more ‘happy’. The evidence does not bear out 
these claims, but that has not prevented them being repeated. 
 
Take, for example, the paper arguing in favour of active labour market policy by David 
Blanchflower (2009), then a member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, who 
had gained credibility for having forecast a financial setback. He began by recalling the quip by 
Jim Heckman, the US Nobel Prize-winning economist, who said in response to a question about 
how much labour market training schemes had helped the unemployed, ‘Zero is not a bad 
number.’ Blanchflower then noted findings showing how subsidised employment schemes had 
been inefficient, even to the extent of having a negative long-term effect on the incomes of 
recipients.
5
 It is hard to understand the leap from such findings to advocating more active labour 
market policies. Blanchflower does so by citing research suggesting that participation in one 
scheme modestly raised the participants’ probability of employment (Blundell et al., 2001), and a 
study suggesting that those who participated in the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) spent 
less time on benefits than those who did not (Beale et al., 2008). He did not cite any other 
finding (for a more recent article, see Gregg et al., 2009). 
  
These arguments are irrelevant in macroeconomic terms. They ignore the probability of 
large substitution and deadweight effects. The fact that those given more help than others do 
better than others does not mean that everybody does better. It is surely desirable to give help to 
those with intrinsic disadvantages. But this does not mean that the policy is advantageous as a 
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macroeconomic device. Blanchflower gives no reason for thinking that such policies would 
generate more employment or economic growth (let alone happiness). 
 
Policy proposals should correspond to the nature of the labour market and the nature of the 
‘class’ structure, both of which are very different now from what typified the pre-globalisation 
era. A majority who labour and work are essentially detached from the old forms of state and 
enterprise benefits and the main group to have emerged is a global ‘precariat’, in and out of 
temporary, insecure or sometimes shadow-economy jobs. Partly as a result of labour 
liberalisation, millions have joined the precariat. Many are immigrants or the young. Those aged 
15 to 24, for example, account for more than a third of people in short-term jobs in Europe, even 
though this age group makes up only 10% of the labour force. 
 
Eurostat has estimated that short-term employees account for about 17% of all employees 
in the Euro zone. Since many people in the labour market margins are unregistered for various 
reasons, it would not be surprising if the actual share was well over 20%. On top of that, one 
should add all those counted as ‘self-employed’ or ‘independent labour contractors’. 
 
The precariat bore the brunt of the early rounds of dis-employment. For instance, in Spain 
the number of officially recorded temporary workers fell by 12.7% between the last quarter of 
2007 and the last quarter of 2008. In the USA, the number fell by nearly 25% between February 
2008 and February 2009, at a time when total employment fell by just 3%. 
 
While the crisis induced a rapid decline in employment (even by comparison with the 
recession in 2001), loss of ‘precariat’ jobs will often not have shown up in official statistics. 
And, compared with the welfare state era, more of those in so-called ‘permanent’, or regular, 
employment contracts have been put on some form of short time. This makes it unlikely that 
raising unemployment benefits and increasing the duration of entitlement would do much as an 
economic stabiliser. For instance, in Germany a worker must be in full-time employment for at 
least a year before becoming eligible for full unemployment benefits. In most industrialised 
countries, only a minority of the unemployed qualifies for and receives unemployment benefits. 
Raising them may both increase open unemployment (because more people will register as 
unemployed) and cause more resentment among the precariat, which is denied them. This 
comment should not be interpreted as hostility to higher or longer benefits, merely a reminder of 
the limitations of this route. 
 
In terms of the policy stress tests, active labour market policies have little effect on 
aggregate demand, are a wasteful use of resources and do not address the economic insecurity 
that characterises the growing precariat class. Neglected by policymakers, its members comprise 
the new ‘dangerous class’, the group most inclined to take to the streets or vote for right-wing 
extremists, as similar groups did in the 1930s. 
       
D. Public works 
 
In every recession there is a lobby for public works, often fuelled by misty recollections of 
Roosevelt’s New Deal (Hutton, 2009). In this regard, one should differentiate between counter-
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cyclical infrastructural investment and public works, even though in practice the distinction may 
be blurred. Counter-cyclical infrastructural investment emphasises investment spending to 
provide a stimulus to demand, and hence employment. The motivation behind public works is 
primarily to absorb some of the unemployed, with an emphasis on labour-intensive projects, 
sometimes of dubious economic value. 
 
More infrastructural investment is required, particularly in the USA, where decay is 
palpable. The ‘green’ agenda is also well-timed in this respect. But most infrastructure initiatives 
are – and should be – slow working, in that they require proper planning and careful 
administration. In a recession, those basics tend to be neglected. It should also be recalled that in 
the 1990s Japan failed to kick start its economy via an infrastructure-based stimulus, and that the 
Eisenhower public works, cited by President Obama with such enthusiasm when he signed a 
$787 billion stimulus package in February 2009 in Denver, took three times as long as 
anticipated to roll out. It is hard to spend fast and spend well at the same time. 
 
Public works also have large deadweight and substitution effects that, as with all subsidies, 
reduce the net economic effect. 
 
One tendency displayed by the public works lobby is to slip effortlessly from saying that 
people ‘want to work’ to saying ‘jobs raise the spirit’, so justifying public works. Many jobs do 
not raise the spirit, and it ill becomes middle-class writers to presume that people’s spirits are 
lifted by having to labour on building sites, in sewers or in dead-end jobs that they want to leave 
as soon as possible. If there is to be a public works programme, all adults should be involved in 
some way, as a sort of community service. Otherwise, the policy is an unedifying exercise in 
paternalism. 
 
In sum, while an investment stimulus can be effective in raising demand, it can be slow to 
take effect. If undertaken without due preparation, or if the emphasis is on employing as many 
people as possible through public works, the outcome is likely to be an inefficient use of 
resources. Public works also do little to address systemic uncertainty or inequality. 
 
3. Stabilisation grants as shock absorbers 
 
To respond to this crisis point in the Global Transformation, we need new forms of 
regulation, social protection and redistribution appropriate for a global market system (see 
Standing, 2009). The primary problem is systemic uncertainty, epitomised by a rising probability 
of economic volatility, insecurity and widening functional income inequality. Citizens suffer 
stress and loss of wellbeing as a result, and consumption and investment are erratic and hyper-
sensitive. 
 
The circumstances demand a stabiliser - not a recipe of cognitive behavioural therapy, 
proposed by the former UK Labour Government to help victims deal with their misery and 
anxiety, but an economic stabiliser that provides ex ante basic security. The policy must act 
quickly while contributing to the solution of structural problems thrown up the global market 
economy. I believe the solution is quite easy. However, it looks radical, and as such will attract 
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the reactions that Hirschman (1991) saw as the predictable responses to any new idea.
6
 I would 
just urge economists to withhold hasty judgment. 
 
  My proposal is that all citizens should receive a regular ‘economic stabilisation grant’ 
(ESG), equivalent to, say, £30 a week in current circumstances, which would be credited to an 
electronic ESG card. 
  
Before considering the objections that such a proposal is bound to prompt, and the 
advantages of moving in this direction, note the necessary conditions for success. It must be 
conceived as a stabilising device and as a means of responding to an inherent feature of the 
global economic system, its tendency to volatility. It must also be seen as a better basis for social 
protection in flexible labour markets than old forms of social security conceived for an industrial 
society, and better than the paternalistic (and coercive) policies in vogue for dealing with the 
unemployed. Finally, the monetary value of the ESG should be regarded as flexible, as a policy 
variable, just as interest rates are now. 
 
There will be five objections. Let us consider them briefly. 
  
First, it will be said it is unaffordable. Roughly, a weekly payment of £30 would come to 
about £75 billion a year, or some 4% of GDP. This is the same as was given to the banking 
community in quantitative easing, merely as a first tranche.
7
 Moreover, like other countries, the 
UK was wallowing in government subsidies. Much of that spending could have been directed to 
market-strengthening and security-strengthening stabilisation grants. The drawbacks of selective 
subsidies, most of which go directly or indirectly to relatively well-off individuals and firms, 
were reviewed briefly earlier. Finally, while ESGs should be universal and equal, the money 
going to richer members of society could be clawed back in tax, leaving the net cost well below 
the immediate cost. 
 
Another reason for believing that ESGs are affordable is that in the UK in 2009, public 
debt as a percentage of GDP, at 58%, was significantly lower than in the USA (81%), Italy 
(102%), Germany (76%), France (72%) and Canada (63%) (IMF, 2009). ESGs would also seem 
to pass the IMF’s proposed four-pillar stress test. The IMF noted that the size of automatic 
stabilisers is smaller in the USA than in Europe because of the more limited array of state 
benefits - but everywhere these benefits have been shrinking. We need better automatic 
economic stabilisers. The IMF argued, cogently, that a country’s fiscal stimulus should be larger 
where the normal multiplier effects are lower, and noted that the USA and UK have relatively 
low multipliers. 
         
A second likely objection is that ESGs would be giving something for nothing, inducing 
idleness and dependency. There are several retorts to this, including Tom Paine’s remarkably 
modern argument laid out in 1795 (Paine, [1795] 2005). Many of the conventional policies also 
gave something for nothing; the mega-bailouts were given largely to sectors and firms that had 
actually done harm. Meanwhile, ordinary people were unfairly exposed to economic uncertainty, 
since they could not be expected to insure against the vagaries of the economic system. 
Moreover, we are told that people want to work and are ‘happy’ when in jobs. If so, giving 
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everybody basic security should at most induce only a tiny minority to be less hard-working than 
otherwise. And that minority would scarcely be a drag on the economy, since they are likely to 
have low potential productivity. It would cost much more to try to weed out that minority than to 
operate a universal rights-based scheme. 
 
A third likely objection is that no such scheme has been introduced elsewhere, and it must 
therefore be too radical and unrealistic. The retorts to this should be loud and clear. We are being 
urged to think afresh. As Tim Geithner, US Treasury Secretary, pointed out in March 2009, ‘Lots 
of things that did not seem realistic in the past are not just realistic but compelling’ (cited in 
Beattie, 2009). He called for each G20 country to set a target of spending 2% of GDP in 2009 
and in 2010 in fiscal stimulus. The most transparent, easily-monitored, efficient and equitable 
way of doing this would be through economic stabilisation grants.  
 
ESGs would be less ‘radical’ than seems at first glance. In the USA, part of the Obama 
stimulus package consisted of government-issued debit cards for food benefits. And Obama’s 
‘signature tax cut’ was a credit of up to $500 for individuals and $1000 for couples. This was 
praised by the non-partisan Tax Policy Center, which noted that it could be carried out quickly. 
The Center criticised the credit because it was given to all groups, but it could have been clawed 
back from the rich through raising sales tax on luxury goods or income tax at the higher end. A 
more substantive limitation was that it only benefited tax payers, omitting the many outside the 
tax-paying mainstream. 
 
In 2008, the Bush administration had given a rebate to US tax payers, but one-off tax 
rebates do not lead to a big jump in consumption spending. Only 30% of the rebate was spent on 
consumption (The Economist, 2008). The propensity to consume might increase subsequently, 
once fewer people wished to use the money for building savings or running down debt. But the 
need is to make the payment modest and continuing, rather than a one-off ‘gift’.8 People react 
more quickly and spend more if they perceive that a boost to income is ‘permanent’.9 
 
More generally, the ESG would merely continue with the long-established notion of an 
economic stabiliser, now that the traditional instruments have ceased to be effective. 
  
A fourth objection might be that universal stabilisation grants would be inflationary. 
However, this was not a major concern in the aftermath of the crisis, since the fear confronting 
policymakers was deflation. For the longer term, the value of ESGs could be varied according to 
the state of demand and the economic pressures, just as interest rates are adjusted to respond to 
the state of the economy. And what we are talking about is a reallocation of public spending, 
cutting out selective subsidies. 
  
A fifth objection is that ESGs would be distorted for political ends. Any monetary or fiscal 
policy can be distorted, and all are used for political ends, which is why monetary and fiscal 
policies are typically loosened in the run-up to general elections. However, the answer in this 
case would be to set up an independent Economic Stabilisation Policy Committee, analogous to 
the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee. Just as the MPC meets regularly to decide 
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on changes in interest rates and quantitative easing, so the ESPC could sit regularly to decide 
whether the ESG rate should be modified up or down. 
       
What about the advantages of an ESG scheme? 
 
First, it would be transparent and relatively easy to implement. Most if not all alternatives 
have large leakages, high administrative costs and would take a long time to implement. Second, 
ESGs would boost aggregate demand more efficiently and equitably than the more orthodox 
route of selective industrial or employment subsidies. They would go primarily to people who 
have a high average and marginal propensity to consume and to devote more of their spending to 
local goods and services. 
 
For the same reasons, unemployment benefits have been touted as a sensible form of 
stabilisation spending compared with the alternatives. Raising them would have positive effects, 
and in the USA the reforms to unemployment benefit have had the triple benefit of helping the 
unemployed to survive, to pay for healthcare and to hold onto their dwellings.
10
 However, as 
argued earlier, advocates should be realistic about their limited macroeconomic potential and 
their distributional implications in flexible open labour markets. 
 
Third, ESGs would begin to redress what should be regarded as the biggest failing of the 
neo-liberal model of globalisation, namely income inequality. The introduction of ESGs would 
address the most worrying aspect of that inequality, the lack of economic security among lower-
income groups, many of whom are plunged into a cycle of impoverishment following the 
slightest shock or even changes in interest rates.
11
 
 
The labour force of Europe is more stratified than used to be the case. Now that we have 
entered a global recession, barriers to social mobility may become a greater source of discontent. 
Perhaps the popular anger directed at ‘fat cats’ will lead to more demand for income 
redistribution. A virtue of economic stabilisation grants would be that they would reduce 
inequality while giving governments time to devise other methods of moderating inequality 
compatible with a dynamic market economy. In a global system, the long-term trend is for 
functional income distribution to become more skewed towards capital, so that owners of capital 
will earn more relative to those who rely on labour income. That trend will have to be tackled at 
international level and by designing ways of sharing capital income without disrupting economic 
dynamism. In the meantime, ESGs would moderate inequality while enhancing economic 
security and helping economic revival. 
    
Fourth, a hidden set of advantages would flow from ESGs. Having basic security is known 
to induce more rational decision making, so that, for instance, workers would be more inclined to 
invest in skill acquisition. Psychologists have shown that security induces more tolerance, 
altruism and ‘social responsibility’, helping others and welcoming strangers, precisely the traits 
that seem in short supply as a result of the breakdown of traditional networks of support and 
social solidarity, much of which is linked to the policies pursued in the neo-liberal model.
12
 The 
use of universal grants to give everybody a greater sense of economic security would strengthen 
communities and help create confidence that would boost local investment, pride and responsible 
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behaviour. Having basic security would also induce more people to feel less stressed and frenetic 
– two of the deepest malaises of the consumerism that globalisation has encouraged. We can 
have too much security, but as a society we are far from that situation at present. 
 
Fifth, stabilisation grants would offer a mechanism for long-term stability and basic 
economic security. They would feed liquidity into the economy while reducing uncertainty about 
the future. This would help boost consumer spending, partly by reducing the ex ante propensity 
to save. 
  
In sum, economic stabilisation grants would help to make the market economy function 
more effectively and equitably, would help in curbing the growing income inequality, and would 
help stabilise an inherently unstable system. 
                 
    
4. Concluding thoughts  
 
Ken Rogoff, the much-cited Harvard, and formerly IMF, economist, said in 2009: ‘Europe 
faces a plain vanilla recession. It is a deep recession and it’s coming with a vengeance. But it is 
not a paradigm destruction’ (cited in Bennhold, 2009). The Financial Times journalist, Phillip 
Stephens (2009), wrote much the same, asserting, ‘Forget the guff about new paradigms.’ His 
targets were economists who were re-inventing themselves, having earlier said that the times of 
boom and bust were past. Unfortunately, he overstated his case. This is a transformative crisis. 
The world will not look or be the same afterwards.  
 
Major crises lead to major changes. None of us can be certain what will come of this one. 
Some of us hope a more just and gentler form of market economy will emerge. We must all 
earnestly hope that it comes sooner rather than later, rather than after a period of political tension 
and extremism of right or left. It will take time to replace the old model. The lesson of paradigm 
change, as Thomas Kuhn taught us, is that a paradigm breaks down when it cannot answer the 
questions being raised and cannot offer answers within its own logic. But it is only displaced 
when a new paradigm is ready to take its place. 
    
I believe the paradigm shift will not be back towards the old European ‘social model’, 
because in an open economy system labourist forms of social insurance raise labour costs, induce 
unsustainable rigidities and erode competitiveness. Economic security must be promoted outside 
the labour sphere. That will be part of the paradigm shift. 
 
One modest recommendation is that the emerging generation of economists and social 
policy students should urge their peers, and particularly the new political leaders, to match their 
rhetoric about being ‘radical’ by assessing genuinely radical ideas. Economics is a constantly 
unfolding body of thought, and those charged with implementing economic and social policy 
should face demands to think afresh and evaluate alternatives with open minds. 
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1
 Professor of Economic Security, University of Bath. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Social 
Policy Association Conference, University of Edinburgh, 30 June 2009. 
    
2
 Advocates of financial liberalisation claimed it would produce more economic stability. As evidence accumulated 
showing this was not so, they, notably the IMF, argued that short-term instability was the price for longer-term gain. 
This rationalisation looks odd now, and should make one wonder why so many politicians and economists think the 
IMF should have an enlarged role. 
     
3
 Moral hazards arise when a social protection scheme promotes unproductive behaviour. For instance, means-tested 
benefits favoured by the UK and other governments create poverty traps and unemployment traps, whereby taking 
paid work can result in a cut in income. Immoral hazards arise from the fact that, often for the same reason, it pays 
to be dishonest. 
     
4
 George Soros (2009) pointed out that, in 1929, toxic debt was about 160% of GDP and it took three years to clear. 
In 2008, the ratio was 365% ‘without taking account of the pervasive use of derivatives’. 
 
5
 The original research was: Dolton et al. (1994), showing that participation in an active scheme had lowered the 
probability of subsequent employment, and Green et al. (1996), showing that being in a scheme had a negative 
effect on subsequent income. 
   
6
 Hirschman identifies three core types of argument - perversity, futility and jeopardy - used to oppose reform: the 
reform will have the opposite effect to that intended; it will have no effect; or it will threaten the loss of something 
else. 
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7
 The IMF calculated that by early 2009 the UK had spent a fifth of its GDP on bailing out the banking system, 
much more than any other country; the second was Norway, which had spent 13.8%; the USA had spent 6.8%. 
 
8
 Len Burman, head of the Tax Policy Center, said of the Obama measure: ‘A higher share of the tax credit is likelier 
to be spent than last year’s rebate because it is paid out in increments rather than in one lump sum’ (cited in Luce 
and Guha, 2009).  
 
9
 This is one reason for arguing in favour of small continuing grants rather than lump-sum ‘capital’ transfers, since 
the latter involve ‘weakness-of-will’ effects rather than longer-term rational behaviour (see Standing, 2006).  
   
10
 Joseph Stiglitz (among others) has argued that, compared with tax cuts, ‘increased unemployment benefits have 
the largest multiplier effects – cash-strapped families spend every cent given – and meet vital social needs’ (Stiglitz, 
2009). He ignored the moral hazards of giving special assistance to people because they are in a particular condition 
and the fact that only about a third of unemployed Americans receive unemployment benefits.  
   
11
 Consider the case of an elderly couple who have put away savings to earn interest to pay for their nursing home 
care. They did as advised by economists and governments. Now they cannot increase their savings to compensate 
for the very low interest rates, and will have to run them down. They must just hope the cavalry, in the form of 
economic revival, arrives in time.  
     
12
 For instance, the shift to means testing and ‘targeting’ of social assistance, advocated in the neo-liberal model, has 
been linked to the spread of xenophobia and anti-migrant sentiment (Dench et al., 2006). 
